Do moral judgments hinge on the time available to render them? According to a recent dual-process model of moral judgment, moral dilemmas that engage emotional processes are likely to result in fast deontological gut reactions. In contrast, consequentialist responses that tot up lives saved and lost in response to such dilemmas would require cognitive control to override the initial response. Cognitive control, however, takes time. In two experiments, we manipulated the time available to arrive at moral judgments in two ways: by allotting a fixed short or large amount of time, and by nudging people to answer swiftly or to deliberate thoroughly. We found that faster responses indeed lead to more deontological responses among those moral dilemmas in which the killing of one to save many necessitates manhandling an innocent person and in which this action is depicted as a means to an end. Thus, our results are the first demonstration that inhibiting cognitive control through manipulations of time alters moral judgments.
Introduction
You are in a subway station, the train is approaching, and a passenger standing next to you suddenly falls onto the tracks: in a fraction of a second, you must decide what to do. Although it sounds like fiction, this is exactly what happened to Wesley Autrey, a 50-year-old construction worker, in New York's subway in 2007. He saw a neighboring passenger collapse, his body convulsing. The man managed to get up, but then tumbled onto the tracks as the train sped into the station. In a split second, Autrey made his decision. He threw himself on top of the man and held him down in the shallow trench between the rails. Both survived. When asked about the reason for his action, he responded, ''I just saw someone who needed help (. . .). I did what I felt was right'' (Buckley, 2007) .
But how would he have acted with more time to ponder? Had he, for instance, been standing on the deck of the sinking RMS Titanic in 1912, he would have had nearly 3 h to deliberate on the consequences of saving his own life, or sacrificing himself for the lives of other more vulnerable passengers. Combing through historical records, Frey, Savage, and Torgler (2009) found that in the Titanic disaster the crew's survival rate was 18% higher than that of the passengers. According to their interpretation, the members of the crew took advantage of better access to information and lifeboats, thus behaving in line with their self-interest.
These examples illustrate that when moral decisions are forced upon us, they may vary a great deal depending on the time that is available for their consideration. Some moral questions afford us the luxury of contemplating them carefully-for instance, the decision concerning lifesustaining measures for a family member who has fallen into a persistent vegetative state. Other situations with moral implications only grant us a moment to respondshall I thwart the act of shoplifting occurring in my face?
The two introductory examples suggest that time or lack thereof could be a key parameter in determining which cognitive processes, judgments, and actions we engage in response to problems with moral implications. Investigating the role of time was the aim of the present studies. Our focus was on judgment rather than behavior, and more specifically, on an influential dichotomy in ethics, namely, that between deontology and consequentialism.
